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Morocco and the Middle East  
under Mohammed VI 
 
 





This paper examines the broader picture of the Moroccan foreign policy towards the Middle 
East since the accession of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999. It empirically 
documents and analyses the overall continuity in the basic orientations of this policy, showing 
how stability and firmness at the level of agency have prevailed over the significant structural 
disruptions at the regional and global levels that occurred at the turn of the century, which also 
generated greater domestic tensions. Starting from the widespread perception of a certain 
Moroccan ‘withdrawal’ from the Arab scene and the mediation in the Middle East conflict, in 
comparison with the Hassan II era, the different sections address Rabat’s practices and 
priorities in bilateral relations with the countries of this region, including diplomatic tensions or 
crises with Saudi Arabia and Iran; its multilateral performance and approach to the reform of 
the Arab League; its stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict and ambiguous relations with Israel; 
the impact of the Iraq war (2003) and the increasing relevance of economic exchanges with this 




The stubbornness of foreign policy sometimes defies intuition. At first sight, one might have 
expected that the 2011 Arab uprisings, which are said to have changed the face of the region, 
had a perceptible impact on national foreign policies and intra-regional relations in the Middle 
East and North Africa. If both the regional environment and the domestic constraints of 
foreign policy making had been altered, albeit to different degrees, how could the states’ 
external behaviour remain unchanged? In fact, forced to navigate an extremely fluid situation at 
all levels, the old and new leaders of these countries have opted in general to pursue essentially 
cautious and adaptive foreign policies. Slight, often just temporary readjustments in regional 
alliances could hardly overshadow the overall continuity in the basic external orientations of the 
different states.1 
 
The Moroccan foreign policy appears as an example of this somehow unpredictable 
predictability – although qualified by the absence of a genuine political transformation or 
regime change at the internal level. As far as relations with the Middle East are concerned, the 
three main developments as of 2011 were largely in line with previous patterns: reinforcement 
of the alliance with the Gulf Arab conservative monarchies, pro-Western and pro-Gulf 
alignment with regard to the conflict and the possible fall of a non-allied regime in Syria, and 
overt preference for the Egyptian military over the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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First, the clearest proof of the vitality and necessity of the Morocco-Gulf Arab link, for both 
sides, was the striking offer made to Morocco to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 
May 2011, in spite of the geographical incongruity. The initiative was later watered down 
because of Rabat’s hesitance to fully join a club that was politically at odds with the 
‘democratising’ image it intended to project to the international community, as well as 
disagreements between the GCC members. But still, it led to a generous five-year economic 
development plan ($5 billion to share with Jordan) and a symbolic upgrading of the 
relationship, which was labelled as a ‘strategic partnership’. 
 
Second, regarding to the Syrian conflict, the presence of Morocco in the UN Security Council 
as a non-permanent member in 2012-13 forced its authorities to assume a higher profile than 
usual. Rabat’s diplomacy efficiently played the role of driving belt between the Western 
governments and the Arab League leadership in an issue in which they all held rather 
convergent approaches. Among the resolutions drafts it submitted or cosponsored as the only 
Arab representative at the Security Council was the one supporting the Arab League’s peace 
plan that was vetoed by Russia and China in February 2012 and the one authorising the 
deployment of the first UN observers approved in April. In addition, Morocco joined from the 
beginning the French-initiated group of Friends of Syria and hosted its 4th summit in Marrakesh 
in December 2012, in which the Syrian National Coalition gained wide international 
recognition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. 
 
Third, the political evolution of post-revolutionary Egypt and the election as president of 
Mohammed Morsi, from the Muslim Brotherhood, in June 2012, increasingly revealed the 
profound discomfort of the Moroccan monarchy in dealing with such Islamist counterparts, to 
the extent that King Mohammed VI immediately supported the military coup – with broad 
popular support – that overthrew the Morsi administration one year later. At the same time, the 
events in Cairo of Summer 2013 also exposed the lack of domestic consensus in Morocco and 
substantial differences that existed between the head of state and the Islamist party leading the 
government coalition, i.e. the Party for Justice and Development (PJD), along with other 
Islamist groups. 
 
The aim of this paper is to further understanding of recent and topical developments by 
empirically examining the broader picture of the Moroccan foreign policy towards the Middle 
East since the accession of King Mohammed VI to the throne in 1999. Both the factual 
account and the analysis are based on official documents, statements of the Moroccan Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and speeches by King Mohammed VI, as well as news and 
comments from the national (mostly independent) press, and the author’s own interviews with 
practitioners and observers, among other sources. Starting from the widespread perception of a 
certain Moroccan “withdrawal” from the Arab scene and the mediation in the Middle East 
conflict, in comparison with the Hassan II era, the paper will address Rabat’s practices and 
priorities in bilateral relations with the countries of this region, including diplomatic tensions or 
crises with Saudi Arabia and Iran; its multilateral performance and approach to the reform of 
the Arab League; its stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict and ambiguous relations with Israel; 
the impact of the Iraq war (2003) and the increasing relevance of economic exchanges. 
 
Withdrawing from the Middle East Scene? 
 
Relations with the Middle East are certainly not among the three priority areas of Morocco’s 
foreign policy under Mohammed VI, inherited from the previous reign, namely the 
international management of the Western Sahara conflict, the kingdom’s vital association with 
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the European Union (EU) and its also staunch alliance with the United States. Yet still, they 
have remained significant because of, on the one hand, their linkage with the above-mentioned 
prevailing issues and, on the other, the persistently powerful identity-based ‘norms’ that 
multiply their impact in the domestic sphere.  
 
Historically, Morocco’s invariable alignment with the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab countries was 
due to domestic political reasons – the need to address the ideological threat of socialism and 
Arab nationalism, which had favoured the fall of other monarchies in the region – as well as the 
demands arising from relations with Washington and the Western Sahara conflict. Maintaining 
a relatively conciliatory attitude towards Israel and cultivating the friendship of Saudi Arabia, 
the smaller Gulf monarchies and, since the 1970s, Egypt were necessary conditions to count on 
US blessing and prevent eastern (Mashreq) Arab countries from supporting the Polisario Front 
and Algeria, as well as to secure their substantial financial contributions. So the triangles 
Morocco-‘moderate’ Arab countries-US and Morocco-Israel-US would remain fully operative 
during the stage starting from 1999, always with the Sahara question in the background. As 
Abdessamad Belhaj explains: “For Morocco, the solution of the Western Sahara issue is 
certainly a token [gage] of the moderating and pro-Western efforts if its diplomacy in Middle 
East issues… The maintenance of the link between the Sahara issue and the situation in the 
Middle East is favoured by the Moroccan diplomatic capital acquired during decades of 
initiatives”.2 
 
The difference is that, at this stage, the classic approaches of Moroccan foreign policy had to 
adapt to a particularly turbulent regional scene. The new US policy following the attacks of 11 
September 2001 seriously disrupted the precarious stability achieved by the regional system in 
the 1990s, based on three pillars: US permanent military presence in the Gulf and 
strengthening of security ties with its monarchies, ‘dual containment’ of Iraq and Iran, and 
active support for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Iraq War (2003) zapped one of the 
major regional players and unleashed Iranian ambitions to occupy the ensuing power vacuum. 
Further consequences included the rise of sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites (at 
both internal and regional level), the introduction of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the resurgence of 
Kurdish pro-independence movement, the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon, 
increasingly aggressive Israeli military campaigns and Turkey’s diplomatic activism and growing 
influence. Meanwhile, the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000), besides calling 
the viability of the peace process into question, was to intensify the tensions and halt mediation 
efforts for several years. The picture was further complicated by the victory of Hamas in the 
first Palestinian legislative elections (2006) and the subsequent political division (2007) between 
the West Bank and an internationally isolated Gaza Strip.  
 
In this context, in Morocco the perception was spread that the country had lost specific weight 
or “withdrawn” from the wider Arab scene and the mediation in the Middle East conflict, 
especially in comparison with the outstanding involvement – also somewhat idealised – of the 
Hassan II era, or the new activism exhibited now by states like Saudi Arabia. The explanations 
for this lower initiative or visibility point either to the broader regional circumstances or the 
internal political constraints in Morocco itself. Among the arguments of the first category were 
the increasing complexity of the Middle East conflict and the internal difficulties of the 
Palestinian Authority,3 as well as the fact that the major international powers had taken over the 
leadership in the peace process and direct contacts between the parties were now prevailing, 
making redundant the former mediating role of certain Arab states.4  
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From the Moroccan internal perspective, it was usual to attribute the apparent foreign policy 
changes to the new authorities’ will to focus primarily on the domestic problems, 5  the 
reorganisation of the role of the king in foreign affairs, the marginalisation of the royal advisor 
André Azoulay6 and Mohammed VI’s new personal style,7 less inclined to diplomatic pomp 
and characterised, according to sympathetic press, by an “outstanding verbal caution and 
calculated image economy”.8 In his assessment of the Moroccan policy towards the Middle East 
during Mohammed VI’s first decade in power, El Hassan Bouqantar combines both the 
regional and the internal rationales.9 
 
What virtually all national actors or observers recognised was the reduced degree of freedom 
and independence of Morocco’s foreign policy as a result of its unconditional alignment or 
bandwagoning with US positions.10 According to an analysis by Le Journal Hebdomadaire: “For 
years, Hassan II was able to give Morocco an essential role in the Middle East scene… 
Morocco was certainly an ally of Washington, yet however, its nodal role in Arab geopolitics 
did not diminish. Nowadays, Morocco’s alignment with the unilateral policy of the [George W.] 
Bush Administration… leads it to be described by observers as a ‘small’ Arab country”. Among 
the evidences of Morocco’s “marginalisation” mentioned was its “forced distancing from the 
hard core of the Arab League”.11  Another additional factor was the increase in domestic 
constraints: The growing domestic impact and cost in terms of public opinion of any 
controversial action or stance regarding this region. 
 
Finally, these interpretations were compounded with an ‘economicist’ discourse arguing that, 
for the sake of pragmatism and the general interest, Morocco had to focus on relations with 
countries with which it had stable economic ties, rather than continuing to obey the 
“demagoguery of the Arab unity”, as was said12 “The Moroccan diplomacy has worked to 
rationalise its relations with the Arab world and extract them from their affective context”.13 The 
words of Taieb Fassi Fihri, Secretary of State (1993-2002), Deputy Minister (2002-2007), 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (2007-2011) and ultimately royal counsellor (since 2012), were 
eloquent enough: “Morocco is not less active than before in the region, but just we cannot 
continue to feed ourselves with politics alone. The world has changed; Arab countries must 
also develop bilateral or multilateral relations between themselves, looking for human, 
economic and social development. His Majesty, from his arrival to the throne, has always been 
in favour of this”.14 
 
Beyond the Arab space itself, and prolonging a pattern of the Hassan II era, the Moroccan 
foreign policy continued to give considerable rhetorical weight to the ‘Islamic dimension’, as 
allegedly corresponded to the dignity of ‘amir al-muminin’ (commander of the faithful) held by 
the Alaouite kings. Mohammed VI’s will to stand as the representative of the Muslim umma 
and interlocutor of the leaders of other major religions became apparent, for example, in his 
message to Pope Benedict XVI in protest against the latter’s controversial statements about the 
violent nature of Islam (lecture at the University of Regensburg, Germany, September 2006).15 
The Moroccan ambassador to the Holy See, recalled for a few days to consult, returned soon 
to his post.16 
 
In the field of public diplomacy, a remarkable effort was made to internationally spread the 
‘values’ of the so-called ‘Moroccan Islam’ with the purpose of retaining some aura of leadership 
in the whole Islamic world. Furthermore, the post-9/11 context had increased the value – and 
the benefits – of this ‘diplomacy of interreligious dialogue’, which sought to project the image of 
a ‘moderate’, plural and open Muslim country, a space for peaceful coexistence between 
different faiths, and to extend that experience at the international level, promoting exchange 
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and rapprochement initiatives.17 The natural institutional space for such policy and discourse 
was the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
since 2011) and, more particularly, the Rabat-based al-Quds Committee and Islamic 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO). On a different note, the ‘Islamic 
dimension’ was also central in the activity of the various official institutions dealing with the 
Moroccan migrants throughout the world, such as the Council of the Moroccan Community 
Abroad (CCME) created in 2007. 
 
Friends, Foes and Distant Friends in the Bilateral  Sphere 
 
Though adopting a less personalistic and media-oriented style than that of Hassan II, the ‘new’ 
approach to Morocco’s relations with Middle East countries under Mohammed VI continued 
to give priority to the bilateral track. Relations were formally based on the exchange of official 
visits, meetings of the different bilateral high joint committees and cooperation agreements and 
conventions that were concluded on these occasions. In the case of monarchies like Saudi 
Arabia, custom also prescribed that the Moroccan foreign minister was received in audience at 
least once a year, so as to convey a message from Mohammed VI to the hosting king, emir or 
crown prince.18 
 
As far as state visits are concerned, the premiere of the new reign was the tour that took 
Mohammed VI to several Middle Eastern states between May and June 2002. The destinations 
were, in this order, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.19 This was complemented, later in 
November, with another official trip by the king to Kuwait for a meeting with the emir marked 
by good personal understanding.20 A second royal regional tour took place in January 2004, 
including a stopover in Egypt and ‘friendship visits’ to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 
Saudi Arabia.21 Mohammed VI returned to the UAE once more the following year with an 
essentially economic agenda, driven by the growing investment influx from the Emirates to 
Morocco.22 In late 2012, Mohammed VI toured again the Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar) with the purpose of consolidating political alliances and attracting 
financial aid and foreign investment.23 
 
As to the bilateral joint committees, usually chaired by the respective ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, they were the venues for institutionalised political dialogue aimed at giving concrete 
content to political or diplomatic statements and effectively advancing in cooperation by 
thickening the legal and regulatory fabric in diverse fields. Most of them were established in the 
late 1990s or early 2000s, such as the ones between Morocco and Lebanon (1997), Jordan 
(1998), Egypt (1999), Syria (2001) and Qatar (2002). 
 
From the whole picture of Morocco’s bilateral contacts in the Middle East, two Arab partners 
stood out in the first place for reasons of history and political affinity, these being Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia. Relations between Rabat and Amman were reinforced after the accession to the 
throne of Mohammed VI especially in the economic realm. The commonalities between the 
two kingdoms were very significant: Both had association agreements with the EU and free 
trade agreements with the US, and were involved in the Agadir Process which began in 2001; 
their economies were oriented towards export and focused on virtually the same products 
(mining, textile and agricultural/food products). The long list of agreements, protocols, 
implementation programmes and memoranda of understanding signed during these years 
demonstrates the shared will to promote bilateral economic cooperation.24 
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In the case of Saudi Arabia, arguably, the historical relationship was more triangular than 
strictly bilateral, as since the Cold War, it had always been determined or ‘mediated’ by the 
common alliance with the US. The persistent strength of this link after 1999 was apparent, 
besides the extraordinary number of visits by Saudi officials to Morocco, in Riyadh’s unfailing 
support for the Moroccan position on the Western Sahara conflict, attempts to mediate in 
disputes with neighbouring Algeria and significant flows of tourism, investment and financial 
assistance. In return, among other things, Rabat’s diplomacy was one of the strongest 
supporters of the Arab Peace Initiative launched in 2002 by Saudi Prince Abdullah – acting as 
a regent during King Fahd’s illness.25 
 
However, this did not prevent some frictions and moments of distrust from occurring during 
the 2000s, to the extent that some observers warned that “mutations” were taking place in 
relations between the two ‘sister’ monarchies. Firstly, in June 2002, Riyadh did not appreciate 
the highly-publicised arrest by Morocco of three Saudis accused of plotting a suicide attack on 
ships of the US Sixth Fleet located in the Strait of Gibraltar. Discontent arose from form rather 
than content: The Saudi authorities, questioned by the international community after 9/11 for 
alleged collusion with international terrorism, viewed this operation as ‘security marketing’ and 
an act of disloyalty by an old ally like Morocco, which informed the US in the first place.26 
 
Secondly, in April 2004, Prince Abdullah quite surprisingly offered a dinner in honour of 
Moulay Hicham, Mohammed VI’s unruly cousin who had been ostracised from the Moroccan 
palace because of his outspoken pro-democratic activism (and who was at the same time related 
to the Saudi royal family). Rabat considered this ‘family’ event as carrying an unfriendly 
political dimension. The subsequent cooling of bilateral relations led Saudi Arabia to recall its 
ambassador to Morocco for consultations; the position remained empty until mid-July 2004.27 
In response to this gesture, in June Rabat supported the Turkish candidate to the General 
Secretariat of the OIC, opposing the Saudi interests for the first time in this body. 
 
In addition to the tensions caused by the new international situation after 9/11 and ubiquitous 
US pressures, the Moroccan independent press attributed this series of disagreements and 
mutual grievances between the two kingdoms to the bilateral communication deficit following 
the death of Hassan II and the lack of an undisputed interlocutor in charge of relations with the 
Saudis within Mohammed VI’s close circles, beyond Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa 
(1999-2007). A recurrent complaint in Riyadh was that “the Moroccan envoys [were] often 
young and French-speaking [francophones], so they ignored many of the Saudi 
particularities”.28 There is empirical evidence for the relative bilateral distancing of the parties 
which could be detected in the slowing of the rhythm of high-level official and private visits 
between 2004 and 2007. It was not until May 2007 that trust was publicly re-established with an 
official visit to Morocco by Abdullah, who had by now been crowned as the new king of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Beyond the Arab countries, other Middle Eastern states whose relations with Morocco were 
relevant were Turkey and Iran, albeit for quite different reasons. While in the former case the 
keynote in the 2000s was increased cooperation, especially in the economic sphere, in the latter 
it was political tensions that prevailed. The most decisive breakthrough in relations between 
Rabat and Ankara was the signing of a free trade agreement in April 2004, as part of the policy 
of strengthening trade cooperation between Mediterranean partner countries promoted in the 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Rabat’s interest in embarking on 
such process of trade liberalisation, which had been considered since 1996, also arose from the 
exceptional closeness of the EU’s economic ties with this candidate for EU membership 
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(negotiations in this regard were to begin in 2005). According to a triangular logic, this bilateral 
agreement had the advantage of incorporating the Euro-Mediterranean protocol on 
accumulation of rules of origin for exports to the European Single Market. 
 
The arranged conditions were that, as of the entry into force of the agreement in January 2006, 
the unhindered access of all Moroccan industrial products would be allowed into the Turkish 
market, in exchange for a gradual dismantling, over ten years, of customs duties and other taxes 
for imports in the opposite direction. Of the four trade agreements signed by Morocco during 
this decade, this was by far the one developed in a more open and participatory way, taking into 
account the preliminary impact assessment and the suggestions on implementation provided by 
the main employers’ organisation, namely the General Confederation of Enterprises of 
Morocco (CGEM).29 
 
In the following years it was found, however, that the impact of these measures on the 
Moroccan economy was not as positive as had been expected. The volume of bilateral trade 
immediately and visibly grew – by 40% between 2005 and 200630 – rising above 8,000 million 
dirhams in 2007, but driven primarily by increased imports from Turkey. In the same year, 
Morocco’s trade deficit with this country, which had been expanding since the late 1990s, 
reached 5,700 million dirhams. According to a study by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
the weakness of Moroccan sales was due to the inadequacy of its offer and the substantial 
similarity of the two economies, which were both largely EU export-oriented and specialised in 
the same sectors. The attraction of Turkish foreign direct investment (FDI), which in theory 
could have made up for the sharp trade imbalance, did not occur either.31 
 
In the case of relations with Iran, completely interrupted for a decade after the revolution of 
1979 and the exile of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Morocco, the starting point of 
Mohammed VI’s reign was the timid bilateral normalisation movement initiated in the 1990, 
which led to reopening of the Iranian embassy in Rabat in 1991. In exchange for its strict 
neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict, Morocco recognised the Islamic Republic’s right to 
produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Besides being a suitable partner to try to 
establish trade relations with the EU, the strategic position of the North African kingdom made 
it an attractive destination for Iranian exports and investments. The successive cooperation 
agreements signed in different areas should have encouraged a rise in economic exchanges 
between the two states.32 However, the election as president of a hardliner like Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in June 2005 was to truncate this precarious bilateral rapprochement, which 
never completely dissipated historical misgivings. Morocco immediately aligned with the 
positions of the US and Arab countries which viewed with open suspicion Tehran’s apparent 
will to extend its influence throughout the Middle East and beyond. This was perceived as an 
immediate threat, among others, by two old allies of Morocco such as Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt.33 Furthermore, such loyalty was compounded with pressures by the Bush Administration, 
increasingly convinced of the need to stop the Iranian nuclear programme and the application 
of more coercive measures against the republic. Several cables sent from the US embassy in 
Rabat in 2008 – later leaked by Wikileaks – reflect US’ persistent efforts to secure Morocco’s 
support for its strong policies towards Iran.34 
 
This is the context in which the Moroccan-Iranian diplomatic crisis of February-March 2009 
took place. After months of increased tensions, the direct trigger was a statement by Ali Akbar 
Nategh-Nouri, former speaker of the Iranian Parliament and head of the office of the supreme 
leader, describing Bahrain as the “14th Iranian province”. Mohammed VI expressed immediate 
condemnation, in line with most Arab leaders, sending a message of support to the King of 
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Bahrain. The Iranian foreign ministry then summoned the Moroccan chargé d’affaires in 
Tehran, which was an “unfriendly” gesture in Rabat’s eyes because of its exceptionality (no 
other Arab diplomat had been called), as well as manner of his reception (he was received by a 
simple official).35 
 
The subsequent reaction of the Moroccan foreign ministry was to summon the ambassador of 
the Islamic Republic in Rabat, to recall the chargé d’affaires in Tehran for consultations36 and to 
send an official message demanding an explanation for Iran’s action within a week. After this 
deadline expired without receiving any response, it was decided to break diplomatic relations 
with Iran. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation added as a 
supplementary justification, besides recent disagreements, the “proven activism of the 
authorities of this country [Iran], and especially of its diplomatic representation in Rabat, in 
order to alter the religious principles of the Kingdom [...] and try to threaten the unity of 
Muslim worship and the Sunni Maleki rite in Morocco [...]”. This alleged Shiite proselytisation 
was described as an “intolerable interference in the domestic affairs” of Morocco.37 
 
In turn, the Iranian foreign ministry replied with another statement which categorically rejected 
accusations of interference and went further in warning that “the Moroccan decision [was] 
against the unity of the Islamic world needed to defend the Palestinian people and Morocco 
[should] be careful with the traps laid by the enemies of the Islamic world, especially the 
Zionists”.38 This was an obvious attempt to reframe this crisis in a new discourse and directly 
attack the Moroccan monarchy’s pan-Islamic legitimacy, capitalising on the region-wide 
solidarity movement sparked by the Israeli military offensive on Gaza in December 2008 and 
January 2009. Following the rhetorical escalation, Rabat’s answer was that: “Iran is evading its 
responsibilities and trying to extend a strictly bilateral issue to matters over which it has no 
monopoly or exclusive legitimacy. [...] The Kingdom of Morocco is, and always has been, in 
the first line of the defenders of the interests and causes of the Islamic ‘umma’ and the 
Palestinian question. Therefore, it does not need to take any lessons from anyone about these 
issues”.39 
 
Certainly, neither the “humiliation” (hogra) of being the only Arab state initially summoned by 
Tehran nor the alleged Shiite proselytisation in Morocco sufficiently explained such a virulent 
diplomatic crisis, not least because the incident between Iran and Bahrain which officially 
provoked it was solved in a few days without breaking relations. Many analysts attributed the 
diplomatic spat to recent developments in the Middle East regional system and the 
strengthening of a Sunni (anti-Iranian) coalition led by countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
with which Morocco would naturally tend to align.40 The information handled by the US 
Embassy in Rabat (in this case, analysis or speculation from an unidentified source) also points 
in the same direction, namely that the rupture of relations with Iran and the campaign against 
Shiism in Morocco were mainly due to the “instigation” of Saudi Arabia, as well as the 
Mohammed VI’s need to reaffirm his position as a religious leader.41 
 
Saudi factor aside, other more sinuous interpretations related this bilateral crisis to the Western 
Sahara conflict, as Iran’s formal neutrality was not without hesitation which could have aroused 
the usual Moroccan sensitivities. For example, the Iranian ambassador in Algeria had said in 
early February that “Iran [had] recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and 
maintained this position” (a statement that he would deny later). According to Mohammed 
Darif, Morocco’s decision could be seen as a reaction, in general, to the reinforcement of 
relations between Algeria and Iran: “Rabat has always demanded that the Iranian policy in the 
Maghreb was balanced. The strengthening of a Tehran-Algiers alliance is done automatically at 
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the expense of Moroccan interests”.42 It was even speculated that there might be a ‘Venezuelan 
connection’, in view of the burgeoning alliance between Tehran and Caracas, and the 
recentness of the closure of the Moroccan embassy in the latter country (January 2009), which 
was openly linked to the Western Sahara issue.43 
 
Apart from that, it cannot be ignored that bilateral crises and ambassador withdrawals were part 
of the usual practices of the Moroccan foreign policy in the 2000s.44 The same drastic decisions 
that some domestic voices attributed to the tension, impulsiveness and lack of strategy of the 
Moroccan foreign policy makers45 were praised by others as a sign of a new firmness putting an 
end to “former passivity”.46  
 
A ‘Minimalist ’  Arabism at the Multi lateral  Level  
 
Morocco’s performance at the regional multilateral level in this stage of high fragmentation of 
‘Arab politics’47 was similarly defined by the adoption of a ‘moderate’ and conservative role, in 
line with the positions of Egypt and Jordan, and continued attention to US interests. In May 
2001, Morocco was one of the countries that supported the candidacy of the Egyptian Amr 
Moussa to the General Secretariat of the Arab League, promoted by President Hosni Mubarak. 
Once he took up this position, Moussa chose Morocco for one of his first visits.48 In 2003, after 
the difficult period of the Iraq war, Rabat joined voices demanding a reform of this regional 
organisation. According to Foreign Minister Benaissa, Hassan II had already raised the issue of 
such restructuring years before and Mohammed VI was insisting since the Amman summit 
(March 2001) on “the need for the Arab League to focus on issues that concern citizens directly, 
especially the fight against poverty and illiteracy, and the creation of the necessary infrastructure 
to ensure the integration of Arab societies in the world of today”.49 
 
However, a year later, amid intense debates on the US plans for political and economic reform 
in this region – Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative –  
Morocco positioned itself on the side of Arab countries most reluctant to a radical reshaping of 
the League which would lay the foundations of a true integration organisation (“Arab Union”). 
Hence the fact that its diplomacy supported the Tunisian authorities’ decision to postpone the 
crucial Arab summit scheduled for early April 2004 in the latter country – a measure which, 
according to Moussa, would have “dangerous consequences for common Arab action”.50 This 
meeting was expected to focus on the presentation of a regional project alternative to that of 
Washington which originated in an unprecedented initiative of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria, 
then taken over by the Secretary General. The plan foresaw a full refounding of the League, so 
as to provide it with a new institutional structure – including a parliament, a court of justice and 
a security council – and a decision-making system in which consensus was not imperative. In 
other words, it was envisaged to turn the League into an international organisation going 
beyond mere cooperation and incorporating elements of integration, with the EU as the 
inevitable reference point. However, in the preparatory meetings for the Tunis summit, 
insurmountable differences arose between the plan’s sponsors and other counties like Qatar, 
Oman, Tunisia and Morocco. 
 
The foundations of the Moroccan official position on Arab cooperation or integration at this 
stage had been presented by Benaissa at a previous meeting of the Council of the League. 
Morocco’s priorities and interests were listed as: 
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• Priority of socio-economic development and the fight against poverty and illiteracy: 
“We are called in the first place to respond to the needs of Arab citizens, before 
dedicating ourselves to abstract and unrealisable issues”. 
• Primacy of economic cooperation: “Arab states should focus their joint action on 
strengthening Arab economic cooperation through the establishment of efficient 
mechanisms, the creation of a favourable climate to attract Arab investment, the 
encouragement of employment and the fight against brain drain”. 
• The Agadir Agreement as reference model: “The objectives pursued with this 
agreement are an important indicator of the actions to be undertaken in the field of 
Arab cooperation”. 
• Inadequacy of the EU model and caution against the “temptation” to go with the 
current fashion (l’air du temps): “The EU has sovereign powers transferred by the 
member states, while this not the case of the General Secretariat of the Arab League”. 
• Gradualism: “Taking a stepwise approach to the development of joint Arab action and 
avoiding the creation of mechanisms whose costs will be hard to bear for the Arab 
states”. 
• Evaluation of the action of the General Secretariat in order to establish its 
responsibilities for administrative and financial management, and review and 
modernisation of management mechanisms. 
• Need to revise the charter of the League, considered to be “obsolete”, and resolve the 
anomaly of its appending texts, which have no constitutional basis and are therefore not 
legally binding.51 
 
According to this official discourse, what Rabat advocated was a ‘minimalist’ Arabism – 
concerned to maintain intact the sovereignty of individual states.52 This was essentially pragmatic 
and ‘economicist’. Independent press analyses considered that Morocco’s “forced distancing 
from the hard core of the Arab League” largely resulted from the fear of alienating itself from 
the US, as evidently the proposed reenergising and reforms of the League were not to the liking 
of the Bush Administration. In addition to this, Rabat’s reluctance to endorse greater Arab 
integration arose from two more ‘national’ constraints. On the one hand, it was preferred to 
continue prioritising bilateralism “for obvious reasons of domestic politics”, as stated by 
diplomatic sources in reference to the Western Sahara conflict. On the other hand, Minister 
Benaissa argued that Morocco was already engaged in important institutional reforms and thus 
the future of the Arab League should not lead to the creation of a supranational institution with 
the capacity to “interfere” in the internal affairs of its member states.53 
 
In January 2005, Morocco submitted its own document on the review of the Charter of the 
Arab League on the eve of an extraordinary session of the organisation’s Council (foreign 
ministers) focusing on this topic. Minister Benaissa seized the opportunity to remind his 
counterparts that in previous decades the kings Mohammed V and Hassan II had already 
advocated the reform of this organisation, and that “Morocco’s positions and initiatives [had] 
always been balanced, moderate, flexible and concerned [about the development] of common 
Arab action”.54 Discussions on how to “rationalise” and “invigorate” this joint action continued 
until the Algiers summit (March 2005), which was presented as a meeting intended to relaunch 
it, but ultimately did not bear any concrete results.55 
 
In any case, the delayed effect of these divergences on the future of the Arab League was that 
countries like Morocco gradually withdrew from, or lost interest in, this regional sphere, 
increasingly monopolised by those states who were trying since 2001-2002, even timidly, to 
conduct foreign policies that were less dependent on the US, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
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The desire to distance themselves from US policies towards Iran, Lebanon and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict displayed by some of Washington’s oldest and staunchest allies in the 
Middle East, in view of the serious deterioration of the regional situation, had led to an 
unprecedented period of diplomatic activism56 and the revival of a certain pan-Arab discourse, 
in tune with the expectations of a large part of the population. 
 
The fact that Morocco stayed on the edge of this movement and Mohammed VI did not even 
attend the key Arab summit held in Riyadh in March 2007, for reasons that were not clarified, 
did not go unnoticed by the national press, especially the most critical papers: “The speech by 
King Abdullah has the advantage of being in tune with a highly consensual pan-Arab sentiment. 
A formula that was once highly appreciated by Hassan II, when Morocco played (certainly in a 
very different context) a leading role in the Arab diplomacy, and that currently does not appear 
to be among [Morocco’s] main concerns, while the political situation in Iraq and Palestine is 
considered by the Moroccans (as proven by opinion polls and popular mobilisation) as an 
identity issue as important as those relating to their everyday concerns”.57 Evidently, in one way 
or another, the centre of gravity of what remained of ‘Arab politics’ was increasingly shifting to 
the East. 
 
Confl ict ing ‘Norms’ and Interests in the Middle East Confl ict  
 
Besides developments at the bilateral and multilateral levels, much of Morocco’s interest for 
the Middle East under Mohammed VI inevitably focused on the conflict between Israel and 
the Palestinians. As if the issue was not complex enough, the new Moroccan head of state was 
surprised by the start of the Second Intifada just one year after his accession to the throne. The 
stances of the North African kingdom on this conflict had always been awkward, due to the 
difficulty of reconciling consensual identity-related loyalties with other less popular relations 
which were still driven by non-negligible state interests. That is to say, on the one hand, 
solidarity with the Palestinian people and opposition to Zionism were one of the powerful 
‘norms of Arabism’58 that still constrained the states’ behaviour throughout the region (even 
when they were cynically manipulated).  But on the other hand, within the hierarchy of foreign 
policy interests of Rabat, relations with Israel obeyed to the demands of the alliance with the 
US and the international legitimation of the Moroccan positions on Western Sahara, two 
equally vital issues. 
 
The apparent success of the peace process had mitigated or muted these tensions during the 
1990s. The Oslo Accords (1993) allowed granting the Moroccan-Israeli relations a semi-official 
character and respectively opening liaison offices in Tel Aviv and Rabat. The gradual bilateral 
normalisation process became apparent in increasing trade flows and even in the attitude of 
public opinion. According to a survey published in late 1998, for example, 49% of Moroccans 
favoured complete normalisation of relations with Israel, and 63% approved of the existence of 
an Israeli liaison office in Rabat.59 However, the election as prime minister of conservative 
Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 spread pessimism about the peace process and put an end to the 
‘honeymoon’ between Morocco and Israel. Public hostility towards the Jewish state and 
internal opposition to maintaining political and economic relations with it resurfaced in the 
kingdom.60 At the end of the decade, attempts by Netanyahu’s successor, Ehud Barak (1999-
2001), to revive the peace process fuelled rumours that Morocco had been requested to play 
again a “leading role” as an intermediary.61 Finally, Barak’s expected visit to Rabat would not 
take place until the funeral of Hassan II (July 1999), which was attended by a large Israeli 
delegation in recognition of the mediating role played by the late king for decades.62 
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Mohammed VI’s policy in this area was mainly driven by inertia and continuity during his first 
year in power. The foundations of the official Moroccan stance had not changed for quite 
some time: These were the search for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace based on respect 
for international law (resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council) and the 
commitments made by both parties; the creation of an independent Palestinian state coexisting 
with Israel and with its capital in East Jerusalem (considered as occupied territory); and the 
principle of ‘land for peace’.63 In addition, the status of Jerusalem necessarily occupied a central 
place in the national discourse, due to the Moroccan king’s position as president of the al-Quds 
Committee of the OIC. The defence of Muslim heritage of the city was presented as a cause of 
the Islamic umma, “a matter that occupies an important place in the heart of every Muslim”.64 
 
The authorities in Tel Aviv somehow feared for the future of bilateral relations following the 
dismissal of the Moroccan Ministry of Interior Driss Basri, one of their most trusted 
interlocutors in Rabat since the 1980s. Notwithstanding this, common agricultural and 
industrial projects, tourism and trade continued their course without mishap. Thus, Moroccan 
exports to Israel reached $830 million in 2000.65 As far as the peace process was concerned, the 
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was received by Mohammed VI in Rabat in 
September 1999, two days after the president of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, and 
personally informed him of the state of the negotiations. This visit was interpreted, again, as a 
gesture of appreciation for the mediating role played by Morocco in the Middle East conflict. 
In January 2000, it was the turn of Foreign Minister David Levy of Israel to meet the king.66 
The Moroccan involvement in this series of contacts continued even after the failure of the 
Camp David summit between Barak, Arafat and President Bill Clinton in July 2000. 
Mohammed VI then chaired a meeting of the al-Quds Committee in Agadir in which the 
Palestinian leader was invited to explain his refusal to sign the deal brokered by the US (28 
August). Shortly thereafter the new Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, travelled to the 
same city with a similar agenda (4 September). 
 
All this happened just before the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the Palestinian territories 
late September, which definitely buried the ailing peace process. Countries like Qatar, Oman, 
Tunisia and Morocco closed their liaison offices in Tel Aviv right away in protest against the 
Israeli army’s disproportionate use of violence to quell the uprising.67 According to official 
figures, bilateral trade between Morocco and Israel immediately decreased from this moment.68 
On the diplomatic front, fulfilling his responsibilities as the president of the al-Quds 
Committee, Mohammed VI called an urgent meeting in which support was reaffirmed for the 
Palestinian position on Jerusalem and a call was made to recognise this city as the capital of an 
independent Palestinian state. Rabat also supported the resolution of the extraordinary summit 
of the Arab League held in Cairo in late October which recommended breaking all relations 
with Israel. 69  Domestically, the widespread condemnation of the Israeli atrocities, whose 
shocking images were broadcasted by the pan-Arab television channels as well as Moroccan 
media, resulted in the organisation, almost simultaneously, of two huge demonstrations in 
Rabat and Casablanca, the first (7 October) having official character and the second (8 
October), called by several Islamist forces, being instead banned.70 
 
After this first critical moment, however, Mohammed VI made some attempts to recover a 
mediating role. At the very end of 2000, he received in Rabat to discuss US peace proposals 
both Arafat (12 December) and Shimon Peres (28 December) – the latter of whom would 
become the new Israeli foreign minister three months later.71 Arafat revisited the North African 
kingdom on the eve of the Arab League summit in Amman (March 2001), when a common 
Arab position to support the Intifada was being negotiated. 72  However, in the end, the 
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Moroccan head of state did not attend that meeting, which he delegated to his foreign minister. 
This unexcused absence revived doubts about his true commitment to the Palestinian cause 
and earned him the reproaches of his counterpart King Abdullah of Jordan.73 
 
At this stage, evidently enough, the recurrent division was reappearing between ‘moderate’ 
Arab states which were reluctant to distance themselves from the US positions and those more 
willing to strongly censure the Israeli actions. Morocco openly sided with the former camp the 
following year, when it emerged as one of the most active advocates of the Arab Peace Initiative 
by Saudi Prince Abdullah. On the eve of the Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002, in which 
this initiative was finally approved, Mohammed VI called on Arab leaders to help stop violence 
in the Palestinian territories by supporting the ‘land for peace’ proposal. Furthermore, it also 
had the precedent of the previous Saudi-originated Fahd Plan (1981), supported as well at the 
time by Morocco, which allowed the Moroccan press to praise again the “visionary and 
prophetic” attributes of Hassan II.74 
 
The problem was that, at this very moment, the bloodiest Israeli military offensive in the West 
Bank, known as Operation Defensive Shield, started in retaliation for a series of Palestinian 
suicide attacks. In early April, the streets of Rabat hosted one of the largest demonstrations of 
solidarity with the Palestinian people ever recorded in the entire Arab world, supported by all 
the country’s political and social forces. The demonstration was more than one million strong.75 
The protest was timely scheduled for the day before the visit of the US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell to Rabat, which was the first stage of a controversial Middle East tour.76 
 
Later on, as of the spring of 2003, Mohammed VI gave explicit support to the new Roadmap 
by the Quartet (made up of the US, the EU, Russia and the UN), which was considered to be 
compatible with the previous Arab Peace Initiative. However, the king declined the invitation 
to participate in the Sharm al-Sheikh summit (June 2003) in which its implementation 
mechanisms were to be discussed.77 On the other hand, in December, Mohammed VI did 
receive in Marrakesh the former Israeli and Palestinian ministers Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abd 
Rabbo, who were promoting the non-official and civil society-based Geneva Initiative 
throughout the Arab capitals.78 In late 2004, a new mass rally of solidarity with the victims of the 
conflicts in Palestine and Iraq took place in Rabat, this time with the absence of the parties of 
the government coalition, and while the city was hosting the Forum for the Future, promoted 
by the US in the framework of the BMENA initiative.79 
 
The relations between Morocco and the Palestinian Authority entered a new phase of 
difficulties as a result of the electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006 and subsequent intra-
Palestinian clashes. The only official statement of Rabat on this thorny internal conflict – which 
would eventually lead to the de facto political division between the West Bank and Gaza – was 
a later call by Mohammed VI, acting as president of the al-Quds Committee, to “put an end to 
violence and clashes and favour the path of dialogue and national reconciliation”. This was 
actually a sign of support for the initiative of Saudi King Abdullah to organise talks between 
Fatah and Hamas representatives in the city of Mecca.80 For the moment, in April 2006, the 
king received a visit by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to discuss the latest 
developments in the occupied territories81 and another meeting was announced in Morocco 
between a Palestinian and an Israeli delegation, mediated by the royal advisor Azoulay (but 
ultimately cancelled).82 
 
Tensions with Israel rose again in July 2006, after this country attacked from air and invaded by 
land southern Lebanon. The official position expressed by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs was “[condemning the] use of force against civilians by Israel and its consequences in 
terms of loss of life and destruction of infrastructure and civil facilities”.83 The main cities of the 
kingdom immediately became the scene of a new cycle of protests against the war. This time 
again, the main demonstration organised with ‘national’ character, which took place in Rabat 
on 6 August, was not supported by the political parties being part of the government.84 
 
In 2008, after some months of apparent momentum in negotiations,85 the next Middle East 
crisis the Moroccan diplomacy had to face was the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip 
(Operation Cast Lead) that took place between December 2008 and January 2009. Besides 
some initial diplomatic mobilisation, Morocco maintained during this episode a stance of 
balance and ambiguity, hiding to a great extent behind recurring calls for concerted Arab action. 
The aim was to prevent the risks – both external and internal – of openly endorsing one of the 
two sides emerged in the new polarisation of the region.86 Deep differences had surfaced 
between the countries that supported the authorities of Hamas one way or another, headed by 
Syria and Qatar, and those which, like Egypt, hoped for the defeat of the Palestinian Islamist 
organisation even more than Israel, for fear of internal destabilisation. 
 
Meanwhile, throughout all these crises following the Second Intifada, bilateral relations 
between Morocco and Israel continued to be marked by ambiguity. Beyond the dramatic 
closure of the liaison office, the presence of shared security interests and common ties with the 
US ensured the continuity of economic flows and political contacts between Tel Aviv with this 
and other Maghreb states. Yet all this happened behind the scenes, always avoiding publicising 
or granting official character to the relations. As explained by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman: 
“Morocco has been comfortable enough with maintaining the status quo, i.e. a partially open 
door to Israel in the realms of tourism, diplomacy, and presumably security cooperation”.87 
The Moroccan independent press was also well aware of this reality.88 In practice, the double 
game of Morocco consisted in alternating periodic statements condemning Israel’s acts of 
aggression, military escalations or violations of international law – calls on the international 
community to intervene to stop abuses,89 defence of the legal status or the Muslim historical 
heritage of the city of Jerusalem by the king as president of the al-Quds Committee90 – with 
tentative moves towards a progressive normalisation of bilateral relations. 
 
‘Normalisation’ acts implied prioritising bilateral relations and shared interests between 
Morocco and Israel over the traditional focus on the Middle East conflict, an approach that was 
seen by some as a hallmark of Mohammed VI’s foreign policy. The subtle evolution of the 
overall strategy towards the Middle East coincided, according to some sources, with the 
progressive transfer of responsibility for the relations with Israel from the king to the foreign 
ministry. This seemed an attempt to downgrade their category, visibility and internal sensitivity, 
providing them with a more technical and depoliticised appearance while advancing in their 
institutionalisation. According to an analysis by Al Usbue, the new pragmatic course hinted in 
this issue included “moving it out of the palace, liberating it from the complex of Jerusalem and 
the emirate of the faithful, and achieving some kind of ‘advanced relationships’ between the 
Moroccan foreign ministry and Israel, regardless of the principled positions of the people and 
the king”.91 
 
The first and most controversial movement known in this regard in the context of the Second 
Intifada was the visit to the kingdom by the Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, received by 
both King Mohammed VI and his counterpart in September 2003. Minister Benaissa had to 
justify these contacts claiming that “among the addressed issues [was] a possible meeting 
between Palestinians and Israelis in Morocco”,92 yet the alibi of peace negotiations was not 
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credible for most of the Moroccan independent press.93 The conciliatory gestures towards Israel 
reappeared two years later, after the visit to this country of a Moroccan delegation headed by 
figures like Azoulay, Serge Berdugo and Robert Asaraf in November 2005.94 In early 2006, the 
Moroccan Foreign Ministry claimed in a statement to “closely follow” the evolution of the 
health of former prime minister Ariel Sharon after he suffered a cerebral haemorrhage,95 and 
the king received in Fes the new Labour Party leader Amir Peretz, born in Morocco, before 
the March legislative elections.96 
 
In 2007 rumours were intensified as to an imminent normalisation of bilateral relations. 
Morocco was once again assigned the role of pioneer, charged with paving the way for other 
‘moderate’ Arab states.97  First, the Israeli press speculated on the possible designation of 
Berdugo, then roving ambassador of the kingdom, as its unofficial representative in Tel Aviv.98 
Second, in early July, there was a meeting in Paris between two delegations led by the foreign 
ministers of Morocco and Israel, Benaissa and Tzipi Livni.99 As speaking publicly about any 
contact with Tel Aviv continued to be taboo or ‘politically incorrect’, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs justified the appointment claiming that the talks had been “completely focused” on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Arab Peace Initiative.100 
 
Moreover, in 2008 the idea of honouring King Mohammed V (1909-1961) as ‘Righteous 
Among the Nations’ regained strength in Israel,101 following the publication of new historical 
research highlighting the help the future king gave to the Moroccan Jews during World War II, 
when he was still a sultan under French protectorate.102 Another alternative channel for the 
normalisation with Israel that gained prominence at this stage were some of the activities of the 
new Institut Amadeus which may be regarded as parallel diplomacy.103 In particular, this think 
tank chaired by Brahim Fassi Fihri, the son of the new minister of foreign affairs, invited 
Shlomo Ben Ami to the first meeting of the Forum MEDays, held in Tangiers in November 
2008. The following year, it was the former Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni (2006-2009) 
who appeared among the participants of the event, arousing controversy,104 which was repeated 
again in the 2010 gathering.105 
 
Meanwhile, although the Moroccan authorities insisted on denying any economic relationship 
with the state of Israel since the closure of the liaison office, trade between the two countries 
not only did not stop, but increased. According to some data from the Israel Export and 
International Cooperation Institute reproduced by part of the Moroccan press, 46 Israeli 
companies were engaged in exporting their goods or services to Morocco in the first quarter of 
2006.106 In the first four months of 2009, the companies involved were already a hundred.107 
According to Tel Aviv’s official statistics, the total value of bilateral trade had temporarily 
diminished only between 2002 and 2003, but grew steadily and visibly from 2004.108 
 
The ‘Two-level Game’ of the Iraq War 
 
In addition to the Arab-Israeli question, the other Middle Eastern issue which grabbed the 
interest of the international community and also Morocco during these years was the 2003 Iraq 
war. During the countdown to the US-led invasion of this country, since the autumn of 2002, 
Rabat expressed its reluctance to endorse Washington’s plans in line with most of the Arab 
states. Unlike what happened in 1990-91, when the differences between the leaders of the 
region were obvious, at this time there was a fairly wide declarative consensus about the lack of 
relationship between the regime of Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 attacks, the need to 
peacefully settle the dispute over Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction 
through diplomatic channels and the rejection of another war in the region, both for 
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humanitarian reasons and because of the risks of instability it would entail. Mohammed VI 
insisted on these points in several speeches and interviews.109 
 
Yet such official statements could barely hide the profound discomfort of this and other Arab 
regimes from which the Bush Administration was seeking political support – or even logistical 
facilities – for a unilateral intervention deprived of UN endorsement. However, the appeal to 
international law and the search for a peaceful solution by the king of Morocco and his 
counterparts in the region was just part of a conventional and ultimately harmless discourse, 
playing to the gallery, which contrasted with their real difficulties in trying to distance 
themselves from the superpower and adopt autonomous positions. The problem was how to 
respond simultaneously to the demands of the alliance with the US and national public 
opinions which were unanimously opposed to the forthcoming war; in other words, how to 
demonstrate loyalty to Washington while minimising its domestic impact and political cost. 
This was a textbook case of the difficulties of harmonising foreign policy and domestic politics, 
or ‘two-level games’ theorised by Robert D. Putnam.110 Philippe Droz-Vincent has also analysed 
this as a complex and unstable triangular relationship between regimes, national societies and 
the United States.111  
 
In the case of Morocco, on the eve of the conflict in early 2003, the independent press warned 
that the regime was “more divided than ever between its de facto alignment with the U.S. and 
the attention to the ‘street’, inevitably furious”.112 The official motto at the time was advocating a 
“negotiated, peaceful solution” to the Iraqi problem, arguing that “the war would have dire 
consequences for the entire world”.113 
 
The popular anti-war protests in Morocco began to be set in motion a bit later than those in 
other countries, however. After some small sit-ins, the first major rally took place in Rabat on 
23 February. The call was endorsed by political organisations of all stripes and the ‘national 
march’ was attended by leaders of most parties, among about 100,000 demonstrators.114 The 
demonstrations were resumed with even greater intensity at the beginning of the invasion of 
Iraq on 20 March.115 The biggest ‘national march’, with some 150,000 demonstrators, occupied 
the streets of the political capital on 30 March. Sticking to the practice of alternating gatherings 
in the two main cities, the following big demonstration was scheduled for 6 April in 
Casablanca.116 All in all, these protests stood out as the most visible of all in the Maghreb and 
broke the general trend towards demobilisation observed for years in Morocco. Mounia 
Bennani-Chraïbi has analysed this as a “paradoxical phenomenon of intense politicisation” in a 
context of widespread de-politicisation, in which the reference issue was transnational but 
inevitably filtered by domestic variables.117 
 
The turning point in the protest cycle was 20 March, not only for the beginning of the Iraq war 
itself but also, and even more, for the Moroccan king’s speech about it. As Hassan II did in 
1991, Mohammed VI addressed the Moroccan people in these turbulent circumstances with 
the express aim of “calming the spirits”. His measured crisis speech contained many emphatic 
expressions of solidarity and fraternity with the “brotherly Iraqi people”, but significantly 
avoided any reference to the specific origin of its “disgrace”. At the same time, the king urged 
the population to avoid any outburst of the protests, to preserve public order and to distance 
themselves from those who attempted to exploit the situation to destabilise the country, not 
without recalling incidentally which were the “great causes” or priorities in which the Moroccan 
nation should focus its efforts.118 This significant speech was interpreted as seeking deterrence 
against any spontaneous demonstration, as well as ensuring that the inevitable anti-war protests 
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were channelled by recognised political and union organisations, as happened in fact in the 
case of the great authorised march on 30 March.119 
 
The Economic Dimension: Agadir Process and Gulf Investment 
 
Another dimension that began to gain weight from the 2000s in Morocco’s relations with the 
Middle East countries was economic cooperation. This course of action was in line with the 
pragmatic and ‘economicist’ approach advocated by key decision-makers such as Minister Fassi 
Fihri, with the aim of “[rationalising] relations with the Arab world and [extracting] them from 
their affective context”,120 rather than continuing to “feed them with politics alone”.121 Joint 
socio-economic development and the promotion of economic cooperation were indeed 
Rabat’s priorities for the future of the Arab League stated in 2004,122 in what looked like a 
declaration of ‘minimalist’ Arabism that alienated Morocco from the core of this organisation. 
 
From a trade perspective, the wish to “found the Arab union on pragmatic basis”123 crystallised 
in the 2000s in several agreements forming part of the complex jigsaw of subregional economic 
integration in the Southern Mediterranean – bilateral and multilateral inter-Arab agreements, 
bilateral agreements between different countries and EU (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, 
Algeria, Lebanon) or the US (Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain).124 The most relevant deal for Rabat 
was that resulting from the so-called Agadir Process, launched in 2001 by Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt and Jordan with the purpose of advancing the liberalisation of their trade and establishing 
a free trade zone with a market of about 130 million people. 
 
An immediate antecedent of the Agadir Process was the Great Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA), a liberalisation programme conceived in 1997 in the framework of the Arab League 
in order to gradually eliminate tariffs on all goods (not services or investments) of the 17 
signatory countries,125 but whose implementation was blocked from the mid-2000s due to the 
lack of harmonisation of the rules of origin.126 At the bilateral level, since 1999 Morocco had 
free trade conventions with Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, and the latter two countries had another 
one between them. In any case, the fact is that this initiative was born and gained momentum in 
direct response to the requirements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The 
EMP’s approach in the commercial sphere implied that bilateral (vertical) association 
agreements between the EU and Mediterranean partner countries were complemented by 
horizontal free-trade zones to be established between the latter, trying to overcome their 
“chronic deficit of regional integration”.127  
 
Morocco stood out from the outset for its commitment and leadership in this project, for which 
it was repeatedly praised by Brussels. Such initiator role was useful to reaffirm its proximity to 
the EU and its position as ‘model student’ in the framework of the EMP, distinguishing itself 
from other Mediterranean partner countries. This was even more important at a time when 
Rabat was negotiating its own free trade agreement with the United States, seen with suspicion 
from Brussels.128 Negotiations between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, always benefitting 
from the EU’s political, technical and financial support (4 million euros from the MEDA 
programme, for example), started with the so-called Agadir Declaration (May 2001) and 
concluded with the signing of an agreement in the same Moroccan city three years later 
(February 2004). The delay was due to both the special sensitivity of some of the concerned 
products, especially the agricultural ones, and the great technical complexity of the negotiations. 
The ratification process was equally slow. The last country to complete it was indeed Morocco 
(July 2006) and its entry into force was delayed until March 2007 due to difficulties in 
harmonising the interpretation of the clauses of the agreement.129 
20 | P a g e  
 
 
The novelty of the Agadir Agreement in comparison with previous regional commercial 
integration initiatives had laid in the use of a negative list approach similar to that of the 
bilateral agreements with the EU, as well as the adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean acquis in 
this area.130 Moreover, unlike Morocco’s agreements with the EU and Turkey, it did not include 
any exception for agricultural products.131 However, there were also non-negligible doubts about 
the added value of this framework, given especially the lack of territorial contiguity between the 
participating countries.132 Its implementation was to face persistent obstacles, not only technical 
and bureaucratic but also purely political. The Moroccan employers’ organisation (CGEM), 
which did not play any role in the negotiations of this free trade agreement – unlike in the cases 
of those with the US and Turkey – would later denounce the agreement for having too many 
loose ends.133 The lack of participation of political or economic actors outside the core of power 
reduced these negotiations to a “simple decision-making process”, according to the 
classification by Rachid El Houdaïgui.134 
 
The situation had certain parallels with that of the bilateral free trade agreement with UAE, an 
Arab country not included in the EMP. The latter was signed in 2001 and came into force in 
2003, but soon faced significant blockages in its implementation. The Moroccan entrepreneurs, 
who had not been involved either in these negotiations, even complained that agricultural and 
food imports from the UAE could have devastating effects on the national economy.135 
 
Trade aside, and as a great novelty of Mohammed VI’s era, Morocco deployed successful 
efforts to attract FDI from the Gulf Arab states. This was the aim of the contacts maintained 
with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) back in the early 2000s, 
offering the reduction of obstacles and taxes as an incentive.136 But it was not until the aftermath 
of 9/11 that the Maghreb in general began to receive greater attention from Gulf investors, not 
least because some of their capital had become suspicious in Europe and the US and needed 
to look for alternative destinations. The appeal of countries like Morocco and Tunisia was 
explained by the good understanding between their leaders and those of Gulf monarchies, the 
political will demonstrated at the highest level – in the former case, with personal involvement 
and multiple visits to the region by King Mohammed VI – their apparent political stability, the 
consolidation and opening-up of their market economies, the reforms undertaken in different 
sectors (privatisation, measures to improve the investment climate, major public works, policy 
of tourism development) and their existing trade agreements with the EU and the U.S.137 
 
The historic rise of oil prices witnessed in 2005 and 2006 marked a turning point that was even 
more decisive. In the latter exceptional year, the Gulf countries overtook their European 
counterparts for the first time ever as the leading investors in the Middle East and North 
Africa.138 In Morocco, UAE investments were adding up to $12 billion, which was also to 
provoke some emulation effect from Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. The distribution by origin of 
Gulf FDI was changing and becoming more balanced due to the emergence of companies of 
these four countries and the parallel decline of the traditional Saudi hegemony – especially 
during the phase of cooling of political relations between Rabat and Riyadh, from 2002 to 
2007.139 By sector, the bulk of the capital was concentrated on tourism, real estate and the most 
ambitious infrastructure projects launched by the Moroccan monarchy in this period.140 
 
The trouble for Morocco was that the quality and sustainability of these investments, seeking 
immediate and high profits with low risks, were far from satisfactory. Another fundamental 
obstacle was that most of the companies involved were controlled by the respective royal 
families, so the decision-making was particularly opaque and subject to political contingencies.141 
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Apart from this, Morocco’s relations with the Gulf countries continued to be conditioned by 
marked energy and financial dependence. The North African kingdom imported from them all 
of its oil, worth more than $2,500 million annually. The political counterpoint was some 
generous demonstrations of “solidarity”. For example, in May 2008, Rabat received two 
donations from Saudi Arabia ($500 million) and the UAE ($300 million) as a “contribution to 
the alleviation of the impact of the exceptional rise in energy bills in the Kingdom” (the value of 
its oil imports in the first quarter of 2008 had increased by almost 69% compared to the same 
period of the previous year).142 
 
A final derivation of these economic dependence relations was the increasing migration of 
Moroccans to the Gulf Arab monarchies, favoured by the oil boom and rapid economic 
development of states like UAE, Bahrain and Qatar since the 2000s, in addition to the parallel 
tightening of the EU’s immigration policies. Although not comparable to the European 
countries, which concentrated 85% of the more than 3.3 million Moroccans living abroad, the 
Arab world was in 2008 the second pole of attraction for the Moroccan immigrants (283,000 




Since the accession of King Mohammed VI to the throne, relations with the Middle East as 
such have not represented a genuine priority in Morocco’s foreign policy, but remain vitally 
connected to pivotal issues such as the kingdom’s steadfast alliance with the US and the 
international management of the Western Sahara conflict. Their significance is also enhanced 
by the persistence of identity-based ‘norms’ that have a non-negligible domestic political impact 
in times of crisis or conflict. Due to such contradictory interests and constraints, the legacy of 
King Hassan II’s reign was one of unwavering alignment with the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab 
countries, combined with an emphasis on pan-Islamic identity, openness to dialogue with Israel 
and mediation in the Middle East conflict. Though continuity was pursued globally, in the first 
decade of the 21st century these Moroccan classic foreign policy orientations needed to be 
adjusted to the constraints of a particularly turbulent regional scene, which was marked by the 
new US policies responding to the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the outbreak of the 
second Palestinian Intifada (2000). 
 
The reduction of the margin of manoeuvre of the Rabat authorities, which were caught in the 
middle of Washington’s demands and the divergent preferences of a large part of the domestic 
public opinion and political actors, arguably represents one of the main reasons for Morocco’s 
apparent loss of specific weight or ‘withdrawal’ from the wider Arab scene and the mediation in 
the Middle East conflict, in comparison with the times of Hassan II. In parallel, an emerging 
pragmatic or ‘economicist’ discourse claimed that, for the sake of general interest, Morocco 
should better focus on relations with countries with which it had stable economic ties and set 
aside outdated normative/identity concerns originating in Arabism and Islam. However, the 
‘Islamic dimension’ of the Moroccan foreign policy continued to be rhetorically emphasised as 
a result of King Mohammed VI’s dignity of ‘amir al-muminin’ (commander of the faithful) and 
the increased value placed on the ‘diplomacy of interreligious dialogue’ in the post-9/11 context. 
 
In its relations with the Mashreq, in the 2000s Morocco continued to prioritise the bilateral 
dimension, with Jordan and Saudi Arabia standing out among all the Arab partners for reasons 
of history and political affinity. Relations with Amman were reinforced especially in the 
economic realm, due to the two countries’ similar trade agreements with the EU and the US, 
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and participation in the Agadir Process. In contrast, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the historical 
US-mediated bilateral alliance did not prevent some frictions and moments of distrust that were 
attributed to a communication deficit following the death of Hassan II. Beyond the Arab 
countries, increased economic cooperation was the keynote in Morocco’s relations with Turkey, 
as seen in the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement in April 2004, while political tensions 
grew notably in the case of Iran after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election as president. Rabat’s 
alignment with the positions of the US and Arab countries which viewed Tehran with renewed 
suspicion, chief among them Saudi Arabia, appears to be the main driver for the Moroccan-
Iranian diplomatic crisis that erupted in February-March 2009, irrespective of the Moroccan 
official accusations of interference and Shiite proselytisation. 
 
At the multilateral level, in the debate over the reform of the Arab League that emerged in 
2003-2004 period, Morocco sided with the group of ‘moderate’ countries that were most 
reluctant to accept a radical renovation of this organisation – namely one that would lay the 
foundations for a genuine integration organisation and represent a viable alternative to 
Washington’s BMENA. Rabat’s Arabism was a ‘minimalist’, pragmatic and ‘economicist’ one, 
which viewed state sovereignty as untouchable and put forward instead economic development 
and cooperation as the greatest common Arab objectives. The latter approach resulted in the 
signing of free trade agreements such as the Agadir Agreement with Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan 
(2004), or the bilateral one with UAE (2001). At the same time, the Moroccan authorities 
deployed considerable efforts to attract investments from the Gulf Arab states, which flowed 
abundantly especially after the historic rise of oil prices in 2005-2006. 
 
In the Israel-Palestine conflict, the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada (2000) blew the 
chances of maintaining a somehow acceptable conciliatory position that the peace process had 
opened in the preceding decade. Amid exacerbated tensions and mass demonstrations in 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause in Moroccan cities, the regime sided once more with 
‘moderate’ Arab states which were careful not to distance themselves too much from US 
positions. In 2002, Morocco emerged as one of the most active advocates of Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah’s Arab Peace Initiative, which was adopted by the Arab summit of Beirut. A 
similar behaviour was pursued one year later with regard to the Roadmap proposed by the 
Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN), which was considered to be compatible with the 
aforementioned proposal of ‘land for peace’. Meanwhile, relations with Israel were to evolve 
amid taboos and ambiguities. The closure of the Moroccan liaison office in Tel Aviv did not 
prevent the continuation of economic flows and political contacts behind the scenes. At this 
stage, Rabat’s double game would consist of alternating periodic statements condemning acts of 
aggression, military escalations or violations of international law committed by Israel with 
tentative moves towards a progressive ‘normalisation’ of bilateral relations that were very 
controversial domestically. 
 
Ambivalence was also the keynote in Rabat’s position during the Iraq war (2003). On the eve of 
the invasion, Mohammed VI himself expressed his reluctance to Washington’s plans, invoking 
international law and the search for a peaceful solution. Yet, his was ultimately a conventional 
and harmless discourse, like that of the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which could 
barely hide the difficulties to dissociate Morocco’s foreign policy from the US expectations and 
maintain a really independent stance. This led the Moroccan civil society and political actors to 
organise at the beginning of the war some of the largest mobilisations in the entire region, 
forcing the king to address the people in order to ‘calm the spirits’.  
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In brief, this paper has empirically shown the overall continuity in the basic external 
orientations of Morocco’s Middle Eastern policy under Mohammed VI and how stability and 
firmness (or inertia) at the level of agency prevailed over the significant structural disruptions at 
the regional and global levels that occurred at the turn of the century, which also generated 
greater domestic tensions. The same predictability applies to the fluid post-2011 context, in 
which the authorities in Rabat have made some reflective readjustments to secure external 
financial support and FDI (from GCC countries) and continuing political validation from their 
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